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ABSTRACT
Various organizations at Los Alamos have used tamper
indicating devices (TID) to help control nuclear materials
for several years. During the past year a formal documented
TID program has been developed to be implemented throughout
the Laboratory. Special needs of all organizations have
been incorporated into the program. Applications vary from
waste containers to unique configurations of special nuclear
materials (SNM). Several examples of these applications
will be discussed.
INTRODUCTION
The Laboratory conducts many activities involving
nuclear materials other than processing and storage.
Activities include experimentation, research and development
of assay techniques, analytical chemistry assay, SNM parts
certification, and routine nondestructive assay of SNM. All
of these activities have different problems associated with
the application of tamper indicating devices (TIDs) or seals
to provide some assurance that the material is not tampered
with. Traditionally seals have been used by processing
personnel to control the activity associated with material
in process. It has been recognized for some time that a
safeguards credit for TIDs is possible if the proper
procedures are incorporated in the TID program. The
Laboratory has been designing a comprehensive TID program
for over a year, and is currently in the final stages of
implementing this program. Much is to be learned about the
application of TIDs and how much safeguards credit can bc
given to this program throughout the Laboratory.
THE REAL PURPOSE OF SEALS
There are many instances in the I,aboratory when it i%
very important for operations to know when unauthorized
access to critical material has occurred. This is true
whether we are talking about a processing plant, a storage
vault, or some experimentation. If the situation is
extremely critical the material needs to bc sccurcd in a
manner to pt-cvont any access to it. This mc!iinsn locked
container or a locked repository of ~ome kind. From a
safcgu~ards perspective, detection of unauthorized access to
materfal is one element of an overall snfcquiirdu program to
help ma~ntain control of t.hcnuclear mntcrii.11. With Viirjoufi
systems such as materi~al r)urvci1liinw, physical protection,
:;ccurp Vra[ll t.~, [and~c(:urc opcrat.jon% c~r~ii~, ‘1’1 1) program.%
provlcic another element of as:;uri}nccthnt (’vrryt.hingi[;in
.
control. It must be understood that seals are designed to
detect unau~horized access not to prevent it. A sealed
container itself may be a TID.
The DOE Orders provide guidance to implement seals
as an element of the overall safeguards system. Cne of the
principle benefits of a good TIi)program is a reduction in
the requirement to remeasure material at regular intervals.
This alone may be viewed as a cost savings to operations.
APPLICATIONS
With the wide variety of operation activities at the
Laboratory, implementation of a Laboratory wide TID program
requires a review and evaluation of each activity to
determine the appropriateness of the use of TIDs.
Operations in the R&D environment are quite different from
those in a processing environment for example. Several
typical applications are:
1. Material in storage
2. Material in process
3. Material in experiments
4. Material undergoing assay
5. Classified parts
6. Waste management
7. Material in shipment
Material located in storage is usually packaged in a
safe container configuration that can easily be sealed with
a paper tape type seal which will detect any opening of the
container. This is one of the most typical applications of
seals to containers. When one of these sealed containers is
selected for inventory a confirmation measurement is
performed. This measurement is much less stringent than a
verification assay. This can result in a significant ccst
and time savings if you have a large quantity of material in
storage that is subject to a statistical sampling plan for
the inventory.
Material located in processes can be solid, liquid, or
gas. Very often it is not practical to seal this material
for safeguards purposes. Material inside a glove box is
afforded a certain degree of protection without any
additional seals. Careful eval~:ation is performed on all
such material in process. In general very few TIDs are used
with this category of material.
Materials associated with experiments provide a very
different problem for safeguards. Very of-ten the cxperimel)t.
is outside of a secure vault for long periods of time. F,~ch
experimental arrangement is rcvicwcd and @VZIUfitCd for
potential application of seals. If it is not practical to
utilize seals on such a configurat~on of mntcriaJ. other
safeguards clcmcnt(s) arc ~ncorporatca to qivc the same
level of assurance. Sometimes n l’1[)can be locntcd on a
~ortion of the experimental apparnt.us to provide n crrtnin
dcqrcc of assurance thi]t matcrjal is not movod or di%turbcd
in any way. A good example is an experiment using
solutions. The solution typically will be located in a
system of vessels, tubing, and other apparatus. If the
application of a TID (or several TIDs) to the system is
practical then they will be used to provide the assurance
that a TID would provide in another application.
Materials undergoing assay fall into two basic
categories. The first is chemical assay. Usually the
quantity of material is very small and the use of seals is
not appropriate. The second category is nondestructive
assay where the entire item is placed in an instrument
designed to perform the assay. Normally these items are
sealed to provide the assurance that no one has tampered
with the item during the assay process. This can be very
important since it may take several hours for the assay to
be completed. Each case again needs to be reviewed and
evaluated for appropriate TID application. If it just is
not practical to utilize a seal of some kind then they are
not used and some other element of a safeguards system
provides the required assurance.
Very often classified parts are stored or are certified
as an operation. While in storage if the parts are not
placnd in suitable containers then the cage or location of
storage may be sealed. If located in containers then the
container can be sealed. When these parts are removed from
storage they usually have no need for bei]~g sealed until
they are returned to storage.
In general it is Laboratory policy to place seals on
all waste containers destined for removal and storage to a
storage repository. This not only provides some safeguards
assurance, but also helps to manage the operation of
handling the waste materials. In some cases after review
empty storage drums may by sealed to control the movement of
waste and the drums. Sealed drums makes a lot of sense to
help control waste materials in a plant environment.
There are two categories of shipments at the
Laboratory. These are internal shipments within the
Laboratory and external shipments to/from the Laboratory.
In general all shipments require a special Department of
Transportation (DOT) approved shipping container that is
always sealed before the shipment process begins. The seal
serves to assure the receiver of the material that
una~lthorized access to the material has not occurred since
the seal was applied. This is a standard procedure for all
handlers of nuclear materials.
cONCLUSIQNS
For a Laboratory as complex as the I,o:;Alarnos NationaJ
Laboratory the impl.ementation of a comprehensive ‘1’111program
is not a trivial task. Every potential applicatiorc must
undergo exhaustive review and evaluation to test it for the
appropriate usc of seals. It is usually obvious that no two
Cappljcations can bc addressed in the %t~mcw,~y. Hvcry
~app]ication has its own unique f’~(lturcr~to l)Pundcrst.ood nn(l
addressed in the safeguards arena. The TID program at Los
Alamos must accommodate all the various activities and
operations at the Laboratory.
